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Abstract
Part I of this Essay briefly addresses the legal basis for attribution of liability as established by
the CJ in Akzo Nobel. Part II discusses the Commission’s new attribution policy for joint venture
infringements and its compatibility with EU case law. Part III discusses the application of the
concept of joint and several liability in joint venture situations.
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INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the European Commission ("Commission")
generally did not attribute liability to shareholders for
infringements committed by a joint venture. The Commission
argued that a joint venture over which none of the shareholders
has sole control can be presumed to be autonomous from its
shareholders and therefore an independent undertaking for the
purpose of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union ("TFEU").x There are a few case law precedents
in which liability was attributed to shareholders of joint ventures
that were clearly not independent undertakings but merely
vehicles or agencies of their parent companies.2 Since 2007, the
Commission has embarked on a new policy regarding attribution
of liability for infringements committed by joint ventures. In
various decisions, particularly Gas Insulated Switchgea78 and
Chloroprene Rubber,4 liability is attributed to shareholders for
* De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V., Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The authors
wish to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Tilly Smits. The views expressed in
this Essay are exclusively those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of De
Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V., its partners, or its clients. This Essay was originally
presented at the 2010 Fordham Competition Law Institute's Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy and a version of the Essay is also published in
2010 FORDHAM COMPETITION L. INST. ch. 1 (Barry Hawk ed., 2010).
1. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 101, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88 [hereinafter TFEU]; see Commission Decision No.
91/335/EEC (Gosme/Martell-DMP), 1991 O.J. L 185/23, 1 30. See generally Commission
Decision No. COMP/F/38.443, 263 (Rubber Chemicals), slip op. (Dec. 21, 2005);
Commission Decision No. 94/599/EC, 1 42 (PVC), 1994 O.J. L 239/14.
2. See generally Avebe v. Commission, Case T-314/01, [2006] E.C.R. 11-3085; Metsai
Serla Sales Oy v. Commission, Case C-294/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. 1-10,079; Alliance One
Int'l v. Commission (Spanish Raw Tobacco), Case T-24/05,[2010] E.C.R. _ (delivered
Oct. 27, 2010).
3. Commission Decision No. COMP/38.899 (Gas Insulated Switchgear), slip op.
(Feb. 10, 2001).
4. Commission Decision Summary No. COMP/38.629 (Chloroprene Rubber), 2008
O.J. C 251/11.
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infringements of joint ventures, most of which would have easily
qualified as independent undertakings under the Commission's
previous approach toward joint ventures, and some of which have
even been explicitly qualified as independent undertakings by
the Commission under the European Merger Regulation
("ECMR").5
This Essay argues that this approach is not in line with the
fundamental principles underlying the system of European
competition law. The 2009 judgment by the Court of Justice
("CJ") in Akzo NobeP confirms that it is ultimately the fact that a
parent company and its infringing subsidiary constitute a single
economic unit (a single undertaking) that enables the
Commission to hold the parent company liable for infringements
of the subsidiary. Joint ventures that have been set up and
function as undertakings independent from their shareholders,
however, do not constitute a single economic unit with their
shareholders. Therefore, shareholders should not be held liable
for infringements committed by such joint ventures.
Part I of this Essay briefly addresses the legal basis for
attribution of liability as established by the CJ in Akzo Nobel. Part
II discusses the Commission's new attribution policy for joint
venture infringements and its compatibility with EU case law.
Part III discusses the application of the concept of joint and
several liability in joint venture situations.
I. LEGAL BASIS FOR ATTRIBUTION OFLIABILITY SINGLE
ECONOMIC UNIT
It is a fundamental principle of the laws of the Member
States of the European Union that a legal entity is an
autonomous legal subject having its own structure and its own
rights and liabilities distinct from the rights and liabilities of
other entities. Attribution of liability to a parent entity for
infringements of competition law committed by another legal
entity with a distinct corporate form is a derogation from this
principle. The justification for such derogation lies in the fact
5. Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings art. 3(4), 2004 O.J. L 24/1 [hereinafter ECMR].
6. Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-8237.
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that competition law provisions are addressed to "undertakings."'
Although the term "undertaking" is not defined in the TFEU or
the ECMR, the CJ has ruled that the concept of undertaking in
EU competition law covers any entity engaged in economic
activity, regardless of its legal status,8 and that the concept of
undertaking must be understood not in the sense of a legally
separate entity but as a single economic unit to which several
persons, natural or legal, can belong.9 The concept of a single
economic unit ("SEU") must be understood as a unitary
organization of personal, tangible, and intangible elements that
pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis.' 0 If such an
economic unit infringes competition law, the economic unit
(which may encompass more than one legal entity) can,
according to the principle of personal responsibility, be held
liable for the infringement."
In the context of the application of Article 101 TFEU, the CJ
established in Akzo Nobel that the conduct of a subsidiary (which
participated in an infringement) may be attributed to the parent
company (which did not participate in the infringement) where,
although having a separate legal personality, the parent
company, "having regard in particular to the economic,
organizational, and legal links" between the parent company and
the subsidiary, exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary's
market conduct, which therefore does not independently decide
its own conduct in the market.12 The CJ made clear that this is
the case because, in such situations, the parent company and its
subsidiary form an SEU and therefore form a single undertaking:
"Thus, the fact that a parent company and its subsidiary
constitute a single undertaking within the meaning of Article
[101 TFEU] enables the Commission to address a decision
7. See Aalborg Portland A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-204-05, 211, 213, 217,
219/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. 1-123, 1 59.
8. See Dansk Rorindustri A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205-08,
213/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425, 1 112.
9. See Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. 1-8237, 1 55.
10. See Shell Int'l Chem. Co. v. Commission, Case T-11/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-757,
311.
11. See Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. 1-8237, 56 (referencing ETI v. Commission, Case
C-280/06, [2007] E.C.R. 1-10,893, 39; Cascades v. Commission, Case C-279/98 P,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-9693, 1 78; Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni, Case C-49/92 P, [1999]
E.C.R. 14125, 145).
12. See Atao Nobel, [2009] E.C.R. 1-8237, 58 (citations omitted).
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imposing fines to the parent company."13 It follows that in a
situation in which the parent company is not itself involved in the
infringement-and can therefore not directly be held liable for
the infringement-it is ultimately the fact that the parent
company and its infringing subsidiary constitute an SEU that
enables the Commission to address a decision imposing fines to
the parent company for the conduct of its subsidiary.
The following Part elaborates on when a joint venture can
be considered to constitute an SEU with (any of its)
shareholders, as a result of which infringements committed by
the joint venture may be attributed to the shareholders.
II. JOINT VENTURE + SHAREHOLDERS = SINGLE ECONOMIC
UNIT?
In its current decisional practice regarding joint venture
infringements, the Commission attributes liability to
shareholders for infringements by joint ventures without
distinguishing between full-function joint ventures ("FFJV"),
which have been declared independent by the Commission
under the ECMR, and other types of joint ventures. However, in
determining whether a joint venture constitutes an SEU with any
of its shareholders, it is of fundamental importance to distinguish
between FFJVs and joint ventures that are not full function. FFJVs
do not form an SEU with their shareholders and therefore
liability for infringements cannot be attributed to the
shareholders; however, non-FFJVs at times do form an SEU with
their shareholders, and thus attribution of liability is possible.
A. Full-Function Joint Ventures
An FFJV is a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all
the functions of an autonomous economic entity. 14 A joint
venture is considered an FFJV if it has a "management dedicated
to its day-to-day operations and has access to sufficient resources
including finance, staff and assets ... in order to conduct on a
lasting basis its business activities" as defined in the joint venture
13. Id. 1 58-59.
14. SeeECMR, supra note 5, art. 3(4), at 7.
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agreement, and is considered to be economically autonomous in
respect of its market conduct.'5
Once an FFJV has been implemented, it is independent vis-
A-vis its shareholders and does not form an SEU with any of those
shareholders. Upon implementation of the FFJV, the market
structure has changed for good, and the joint venture constitutes
a separate undertaking (SEU) in the sense of Articles 101 and
102 TFEU. This follows not only from the contents of the ECMR
and the relationship between the ECMR and Articles 101 and 102
TFEU, but also from accompanying notices (e.g., Ancillary
Restraints Notice16 ) and the Commission's decisional practice in
merger cases and, until recently, in antitrust cases.
In particular, with respect to the application of Article 101
TFEU to (contractual) arrangements between an FFJV and one
or more of its shareholders, the Commission has consistently
held that they are not part of the same undertaking. For
example, the Ancillary Restraints Notice assumes that a wide
variety of arrangements between shareholders and FFJVs,
including non-competition clauses, are subject to Article 101
TFEU, thereby excluding the possibility that the shareholders
and the joint venture are part of an SEU. If the shareholder and
the joint venture are considered part of an SEU, Article 101
TFEU would not apply to their agreements. In antitrust cases, the
Commission's approach to the relationship between an FFJV and
its shareholders was consistent with its merger control approach
until 2007.
In Gosme/Martell, the Commission assessed the applicability
of Article 101 TFEU to an agreement between a joint venture,
DMP, and its shareholders, Martell and Piper-Heidsieck. The
Commission determined:
DMP and Martell are independent undertakings within the
meaning of Article [101] (1). At the relevant time, Martell
was not in a position to control the commercial activity of
DMP because:
- the parent companies each held 50% of the capital of
DMP and the voting rights,
15. Commission Notice, 2008 O.J. C 95/1, at 24 [hereinafter Jurisdictional Notice].
16. See Commission Notice, 2005 O.J. C 56/24, at 24-25.
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- half the supervisory board members represented Martell
shareholders and half [represented] Piper-Heidsieck
shareholders,
- DMP also distributed brands not belonging to its parent
companies,
- Martell and Piper-Heidsieck products were invoiced to
wholesalers on the same document [which meant that the
joint venture sold to customers in its own name and not on
behalf of its parents],
- DMP had its own sales force and it alone concluded the
conditions of sale with [customers].17
In short, the fact that none of the shareholders had sole
control over the joint venture and the joint venture enjoyed
operational autonomy (i.e., the joint venture was an FFJV) meant
that the joint venture was not part of an SEU with any of its
shareholders but was instead an independent undertaking. As a
result, the Commission concluded that Article 101 TFEU applied
to the agreement between the joint venture and one of its
shareholders.
Regarding attribution of liability for cartel infringements of
Article 101 TFEU committed by ajoint venture, the Commission
decided in PVC:
DSM transferred its PVC activity to LVM (ajoint venture
with SAV) at the beginning of 1983 but itself continues in
existence as an undertaking. The same considerations apply
to the other parent, SAV. The Commission therefore
considers that DSM and SAV each remain responsible for
their participation in the cartel up to the creation of LVM.
After the formation of LVM that undertaking participated in
the cartel in its own right.'8
Also, in a more recent case, the Commission clearly
established that an infringement of Article 101 TFEU committed
by an FFJV cannot be attributed to any of its shareholders. In
Rubber Chemicals, the Commission assessed a cartel, the
participants of which included an FFJV (Flexsys):
Flexsys N.V. (hereinafter "Flexsys") is a joint venture
currently owned 50/50% by Solutia Inc. (USA) and Akzo
17. Gosme/Martell-DMP, 1991 0.J. L 185/23, 1 30.
18. PVC, 1994 O.J. L 239/14, 1 42.
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Nobel N.V. (Netherlands), with headquarters in Brussels.
Flexsys was formed on 1 January 1995 between Monsanto
Company (USA) and Akzo Nobel N.V. as a concentrative
full-function joint venture, which was approved by the
Commission on 19 January 1995 under the Community
merger control rules. The parent companies transferred all
their relevant assets to the joint venture on 1 January 1995
and withdrew entirely from the rubber chemicals market. In
1997, Monsanto placed the assets of its chemical division,
and the shares of stock or equity interests of Flexsys, into a
new entity, Solutia Inc., which replaced Monsanto as the
parent company of Flexsys. Flexsys performs its functions as
an autonomous economic entity on the market.19
One of the addressees of the Statement of Objections
(Repsol) complained to the Commission that it was held liable
for the infringements committed by its wholly owned subsidiary,
whereas the shareholders of the Flexsys joint venture were not
held liable for the joint venture's participation in the
infringement. The Commission responded:
Finally, the Commission points out that, contrary to
what Repsol contends, the situation of Flexsys with regard to
its parent companies is radically different from that of Repsol
with regard to [its subsidiary] GQ. In the case of a joint
venture, jointly owned by its parents (and over which none of
the parents has de facto or de jure sole control) the joint
venture can be presumed to be autonomous from its parent
companies (i.e. can be presumed to constitute a separate
undertaking with respect to its parents). In contrast, a parent
company and its wholly owned subsidiary (such as Repsol
and GQ) can be presumed to form a single undertaking for
the purpose of Article [101] of the Treaty.20
This is where the Commission touches upon the
fundamental (or "radical," as the Commission puts it) difference
between sole and joint control. The concepts of both sole and
joint control relate to the ability to exercise decisive influence
over another entity.21 However, unlike sole control, which
confers upon one single shareholder the power to take strategic
decisions and determine the entity's market conduct, joint
19. Rubber Chemicals, slip op. 112.
20. Id. 1 263.
21. See ECMR, supra note 5, art. 3(2), at 7.
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control is characterized by negative control of two or more
shareholders that can at best block strategic decisions but none
of which is able alone to determine the joint venture's market
conduct.22 Therefore, the ECMR establishes that a joint venture
over which no one has sole control and which enjoys operational
autonomy qualifies as an FFJV and is an autonomous economic
entity (a separate undertaking with respect to its shareholders).23
The fact that shareholders are jointly able to exercise decisive
influence does not deprive an FFJV of its autonomy.
Also in legal doctrine, it continues to be common
understanding that it is inappropriate to treat ajointly controlled
FFJV and one or more of its shareholders as an SEU:
Further, no economic entity will be deemed to exist between
companies by virtue ofjoint control over another enterprise,
as is ordinarily the case with joint ventures which are
autonomous and independent undertakings. It follows that
agreements concluded between one parent and the joint
venture may be caught by Article [101] (1).24
Despite its clear reasoning in Rubber Chemicals on why an
FFJV is an independent undertaking separate from its
shareholders to which infringements by the FFJV therefore
cannot be attributed, the Commission in Chloroprene Rubber
attributed liability for infringements by an FFJV to two of its
shareholders.25 The precise grounds on which the Commission
attributed liability are yet unknown-a public version of the
decision is not yet available in full-but the Commission had
previously established that the joint venture was full function and
therefore an independent undertaking.26 Therefore, the authors
find it difficult to comprehend how this joint venture can
constitute a single undertaking with its shareholders. The
Commission's previous finding that the joint venture was an
independent undertaking should have prevented the
Commission from attributing liability to the shareholders.
22. SeeJurisdictional Notice, supra note 15, 2008 O.J. C 95/1, at 17, 162.
23. See ECMR, supra note 5, art. 3(4), 2004 O.J. L 24/1, at 7.
24. LENNART RITTER & DAVID BRAUN, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAw: A
PRACTiTIONER'S GUIDE 47-48 (3d ed. 2004).
25. Chloroprene Rubber, 2008 O.J. C 251/11.
26. See Commission Decision No. IV/M.663 (Dow/Dupont), 1996 O.J. C 104/4.
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In a subsequent case, Candle Waxes, the Commission made
clear that it had indeed changed its policy regarding the
autonomy of an FFJV with respect to its shareholders. The
Commission stated:
In the case of a joint venture, it is possible to find that the
joint venture and parents together form an economic unit
for the purposes of the application of Article [101] of the
Treaty if the joint venture has not decided independently
upon its own conduct on the market. Whether or not the
joint venture is to be regarded as a full-function joint venture
in the sense of [the ECMR] is irrelevant in this context as
there is, as shown above, factual evidence demonstrating
decisive influence.27
This is quite the opposite of what the Commission stated in
Rubber Chemicals. And it is incorrect. As the Commission itself
explained in Rubber Chemicals, there is a major difference
between a parent solely exercising decisive influence over a
subsidiary and two or more shareholders that are only jointly able
to exercise decisive influence. As explained above, the fact that
an FFJV is under joint control does not deprive it of its
autonomy.28 To the contrary, the fact that control is divided
between two or more undertakings co-determines the joint
venture's independence.
The Commission's new approach goes against the
fundamental principle of the laws of the Member States that a
legal entity has its own rights and liabilities distinct from the
rights and liabilities of other entities. As set out in Akzo Nobel, the
fact that a parent company and its subsidiary constitute a single
undertaking justifies an exception to this fundamental
principle.29 Such a justification is not available in the case of
FFJVs. An FFJV constitutes a separate economic unit and does
not belong to the SEU of its parents. There is, therefore, no basis
to deviate from the fundamental principle that legal entities
belonging to the FFJV are separate from those of its parent
companies.
27. Commission Decision No. COMP/39181 (Candle Waxes), 1 481 (Oct. 1, 2008)
(provisional nonconfidential version), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/dec sdocs/39181_17288.pdf.
28. See Stephen Kinsella & Anouck Meier, Why Shareholders Should Not Share the
Blame in the EU, GLOBAL COMPETITION POL'Y: ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2009, at 2, 4.
29. Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R 1-8237, 1 58.
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This is also the approach followed in various Member States
including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.30 In these countries, there is no derogation
from the fundamental principle of distinct legal personality in
the form of attribution of liability to shareholders of an FFJV;
shareholders are not held liable for competition law
infringements committed by an FFJV. Similarly, in jurisdictions
outside the EEA, for example Japan and the United States,
liability for infringements of a joint venture can generally not be
attributed to ajoint venture shareholder.
The Commission's statement in Candle Waxes seems to
suggest that there are two different concepts of "undertaking,"
one for the ECMR and another for Article 101 TFEU. The
authors think that such an approach is fundamentally wrong.
The concept of an undertaking is such an essential notion of
competition law that there should not be any ambiguity in this
concept.31 Also the EU courts have always referred to the concept
of undertaking as a singular one in competition law.32 The
importance of having a single concept of undertaking in view of
the overall structure and internal consistency of competition
lawhas also been stressed in literature.33
Contrary to the Commission's suggestion in Candle Waxes,
there is only one concept of undertaking in EU competition law.
An FFJV that is a separate undertaking under the ECMR is a
separate undertaking under Article 101 TFEU. Article 101 TFEU
is addressed to undertakings, and, as decided by the CJ in Akzo
Nobel, shareholders that have not themselves committed an
infringement cannot be held liable for infringements by a joint
venture with which they do not form a single undertaking.
30. See, e.g., Rechtbank Rotterdam 2 February 2010, LJN BN2968 (Lavaredo
Holding/Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit) (Neth.). The court, referring to the fact
that control over the joint venture was divided fifty-fifty between two shareholders,
decided that the Dutch competition authority was correct in not attributing liability to
the shareholders for the joint venture's infringement. Id.
31. See Wouter P.J. Wils, The Undertaking as Subject of E. C. Competition Law and the
Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons, 25 EUR. L. REV. 99, 102, 106 n.23
(2000).
32. See Akzo Nobel, [2009] E.C.R 1-8237, 11 54-55; H6fner v. Macrotron GmbH,
Case C,41/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979, 21.
33. See CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IAW
OF COMPETITION 92-93 (6th ed. 2008); Wils, supra note 31, at 102, 106 n.23, 108.
2011] EUJOINT VENTURE SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
B. Other Joint Ventures
While FFJVs do not form an SEU with their shareholders,
non-FFJVs at times do form an SEU together with their
shareholders so that attribution of liability is possible. The
following Section deals with the standard applied by the EU
courts for determining whether a non-FFJV forms an SEU with
any of its shareholders.
1. Legal Standard for Attribution of Liability for Non-FFJVs
For joint ventures that are not full function, the EU courts
have-in a limited number of cases-established the conditions
under which a non-FFJV forms an SEU with any or each of the
joint venture partners, as a result of which liability can be
attributed to the joint venture partners. In each of these cases,
the courts established that the joint venture partner(s) in fact
exercised decisive influence over the joint venture by directly
interfering with the joint venture's market conduct. This is
somewhat different from the way in which exercise of decisive
influence was established by EU courts in the case of wholly
owned subsidiaries.
With wholly owned or nearly wholly owned subsidiaries, the
courts have established that the parent company is able to
exercise decisive influence over the market conduct of its
subsidiary with which it forms a single economic unit and that it
can be presumed to have in fact exercised that influence.34 In
Akzo Nobel, the CJ held that the relevant subject matter over
which decisive influence is to be exercised is not only
"commercial policy" in the narrow sense such as pricing policy,
production and distribution activities, sales objectives, gross
margins, sales costs, cash flow, stocks, and marketing, but also
"commercial policy" in the broader sense: corporate strategy,
operational policy, business plans, investment, capacity, provision
of finance, human resources, and legal matters, as these may
have indirect effects on the market conduct of the subsidiaries
and of the whole group.35 This is in line with the concept of SEUs
as it applies to subsidiaries that are part of a group and are under
the single control of a parent entity.
34. See Ahzo Nobe4 [2009] E.C.R. 1-8237, It 50-51.
35. Id. 1 42-51, 67-78.
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In the cases that involved non-FFVs, Metsai Serla and Avebe,
the factual exercise of decisive influence by the joint venture
partners was established differently. This can be explained by the
fact that no shareholder has single control over the activities of
the joint venture and that the conduct of the joint venture
cannot necessarily be assumed to have been committed within
the economic unit of either of the joint venture partners, even if
the joint venture is not an FFJV. In both cases, it was established
that the joint venture partners exercised decisive influence over
the joint venture by directly determining the joint venture's
market conduct.
In Metsd Serla,so member companies of a trade association
named Finnboard (the joint venture) marketed their products
through the joint venture. From the facts of the case, it was clear
that the joint venture merely acted as an auxiliary body of each of
those companies. This followed, for instance, from the fact that
the member companies were jointly and severally liable for
liabilities of the joint venture as if it were their own debt.
Furthermore, even though the joint venture was authorized to
negotiate prices and other conditions of sale with end customers
in accordance with the guidelines set by the members, a sale
could not be made unless the member company concerned had
first approved the price and other conditions of sale. Finally, it
was also common ground that title passed directly from the
member company to the end customer.
Avebef' involved a fifty-fifty joint venture, named Glucona,
between Avebe and Akzo for the manufacture, sale, and
marketing of certain products. The joint venture was created as a
purely contractual entity without separate legal personality from
its parents Akzo and Avebe. The Court found that only the joint
venture partners (and not the joint venture itself) could act on
behalf of the joint venture and bind it to third parties. The joint
venture partners did so through their representatives and
directors appointed by them, which representatives and directors
were employees of the joint venture partners and devoted only
part of their time to the joint venture. Accordingly, the joint
venture could not act independently on the market as the joint
36. MetsA Serla Sales Oy v. Commission, Case C-294/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. 1-10,079.
37. Avebe v. Commission, Case T-314/01, [2006] E.C.R. I-3085, 1 92-96.
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venture partners directly and through their own employees
determined the joint venture's market conduct.3 8
In both Metsd Serla and Avebe, the joint venture was merely a
vehicle through which the joint venture partners coordinated
their businesses and market conduct. The respective businesses
that were coordinated through the joint venture were therefore
part of, and constituted an SEU with, the respective undertakings
of the joint venture partners. On this basis, infringements by the
joint ventures could be attributed to the joint venture partners.
The doctrine of attribution of liability as applied to joint
ventures in Metsd Serla and Avebe was applied by the General
Court ("GC") most recently in Spanish Raw Tobacco." In this case,
the companies SCC and SCTC-parent companies of TCLT-
were held liable for an infringement committed by WWTE, a
joint venture by TCLT and the president of WWTE, because SCC
and SCTC directly interfered with WWTE's market conduct.
TCLT did not, and was therefore not liable for WWTE's
infringements. On the basis of the following elements, the GC
concluded that SCC and SCTC in fact exercised decisive
influence over WWTE's market conduct: (1) one of the four
members of the board of directors of WWTE was at the same
time a senior executive of the SCC group and could be regarded
as being part of the SCC group management"; (2) the members
of the board of directors of WWTE appointed by the SCC group
had stressed that WWTE could not act independently of SCTC,
and that although WWTE had its "own identity/entity," it was
"also a subsidiary of SCTC" and should therefore "fall in the line
of the SCTC culture"; it appeared that the board of directors of
'WWTE had no real decisional freedom but had to consult in
many occasions with upper levels of SCTC"; (3) on a whole series
of issues concerning its commercial policy, WWTE had to consult
SCTC and in fact obtained its prior approval, including on
matters as sales (contracts), long-term financing, investment
projects, and small expenditure as low as US$4,800 2 ; and (4) the
representatives of SCC on the board of directors of WWTE were
38. Id. 135-41.
39. Alliance One Int'l v. Commission (Spanish Raw Tobacco), Case T-24/05, [2010]
E.C.R. _ (delivered Oct. 27, 2010).
40. Id. 173-80.
41. Id. 1 182.
42. Id. It 183-88.
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informed of the practices of the cartel in WWTE board meetings,
and the member of the SCC group management who was at the
same time a director of WWTE was also personally informed of
certain aspects of the cartel. The GC held that it could reasonably
be inferred from this that SCC tacitly approved WWTE's
involvement in the cartel, which amounted to additional
evidence that SCC exercised decisive influence over the conduct
of WWTE."
In respect of the GC's considerations regarding the
relevance of awareness of the cartel, it must be noted that the GC
had previously indicated that the question of decisive influence
relates to the level of autonomy of the subsidiary's market
conduct and not to the parent company's awareness of the
infringing behavior of the subsidiary. It held that attribution of
liability to a parent company flows from the fact that the two
entities constitute a single undertaking and not from proof of the
parent's awareness of the infringement." The judgment has been
appealed and it is yet uncertain whether the GC's decision will be
upheld by the CJ.
Conclusion
It follows from these precedents that in the case of a non-
FFJV, over which none of the joint venture partners has sole
control, the courts attributed liability by establishing that the
joint venture partners in fact exercised decisive influence over
the joint venture by directly being involved in and determining
the joint venture's market conduct. As a result, the joint venture
was not an independent undertaking but formed an SEU with
each or any of the joint venture partners.
2. Standard Applied by the Commission for Attribution of
Liability for Non-FFJVs
When determining whether parent companies of a non-FFJV
are liable for infringements committed by the joint venture, the
Commission recently created an alternative formula for
attributing liability. The standard applied by the Commission in
43. Id. 1 189-93.
44. Itochu Corp. v. Commission, Case T-12/03, [2009] E.C.R. 11-909,1 58.
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these recent cases deviates from the one established by the CJ in
Metsd Serla and Avebe.
In Gas Insulated Switchgear ("GIS"), the Commission stated
that the parent companies Fuji and Hitachi were able to exercise
decisive influence and had actually exercised decisive influence
over the joint venture, which was not full function. In support of
this conclusion, the Commission referred to several "objective
factors" demonstrating that the joint venture partners had a
supervisory and management role in the joint venture: that they
had been previously involved in the cartel infringement and that
there were overlapping/consecutive positions of senior
employees/cartel participants in the joint venture and the parent
companies. As a result, the parent companies were assumed to
have been aware of the joint venture's infringement and that
they could have prevented on account of their supervisory role
and responsibility for the management of the joint venture's
affairs. 45
Regarding the supervisory and management roles and
responsibilities, it must be noted that in nearly every joint
venture, the joint venture partners have supervisory and
management roles and responsibilities. Together with the joint
venture partners' equal shareholdings, this typically constitutes
joint control, i.e., the ability to exercise decisive influence.
Referring to supervisory and management roles and
responsibilities of joint venture partners is in fact nothing more
than referring to the fact that the joint venture is under joint
control. The Commission has yet to demonstrate whether joint
venture partners in fact exercised decisive influence over the joint
venture's market conduct, as required in Metsd Serla and Avebe. In
Avebe, the Court clearly pointed out that "the Commission
cannot merely find that an undertaking 'was able to' exert
decisive influence over the other undertaking, without checking
whether that influence actually was exerted."4 6
Although the Commission in Gas Insulated Switchgear states
that the parent companies "actually exercised a decisive
influence,"47 it does not appear from the decision that the
45. Gas Insulated Switchgear, slip op. 391-403.
46. Avebe v. Commission, Case T-314/01, [2006] E.C.R. 11-3085, 1 136 (emphasis
added).
47. Gas Insulated Switchgear, slip op. 389.
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Commission established that the parent companies in fact did so.
Instead, the Commission focused on the joint venture partners'
previous involvement in the infringement and assumed that after
their involvement had ended they were aware of the joint
venture's involvement: "[They] should have known as they were
ultimately responsible for [the joint venture's] management"
and "[they] must have been fully aware of the existence of the
cartel and must have known of the participation of [the joint
venture] in the cartel."48
During the hearing of the GIS case before the GC, the
Commission explained how it constructed the finding that
decisive influence had been exercised by the parent companies:
As a shareholder in [the joint venture], over which it was
able to exercise supervision, [the parent company] can be
held responsible for the fact that the joint venture continued
with the infringement in which it had itself participated
beforehand. By refusing to intervene, [the parent company]
exercised decisive influence over the joint venture and thus
ensured the continuation of the cartel.49
However, proof that a parent company was able to exercise
decisive influence and that it-while possibly being aware of the
joint venture's infringement-did not prevent the joint venture
from committing the infringement is not the same as the actual
exercise of decisive influence as established in Avebe and Metsd
Serla. The Commission essentially states that the parent company
is liable because it did not use its ability to exercise decisive
influence while assuming that it was aware that infringements
were occurring. However, regarding the element of awareness, it
must be noted that the GC in Spanish Raw Tobacco established
that the joint venture partner had in fact been aware of the joint
venture's infringements. Its awareness was not assumed.
Moreover, the GC merely considered awareness to be "additional
evidence" of the exercise of decisive influence, i.e., additional to
a whole body of evidence that the joint venture partner had in
fact directly determined the joint venture's market conduct. In
the authors' view, merely establishing that a shareholder was
48. Id. 1 398, 405.
49. Fuji Electric Holding Co. v. Commission, Report for the Hearing on
Application for the Partial Annulment of Commission Decision C(2006) 6762 Final of
24January 2007, Case C-132/07, 1 86 (on file with author) (emphasis added).
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aware of its joint venture committing infringements cannot
replace the requirement to establish, on the basis of a coherent
and consistent body of evidence, that the joint venture partner in
fact exercised decisive influence on the joint venture's market
conduct.
Apart from the fact that there is no basis in the precedents
mentioned above that awareness by a parent company can be
assumed, it must be noted that the transfer of a business into a
joint venture typically includes relevant employees (and
therefore the company's "knowledge" of the infringement).
Therefore, an assumption that a joint venture partner is aware or
that it should be deemed to be aware of subsequent
infringements of the joint venture is, in the authors' view, a
questionable basis for attribution of liability.
Conclusion
Since 2007 the Commission has applied an alternative
method of attributing liability to shareholders of a non-FFJV that
deviates from the case law established in Metsd Serla and Avebe.
The Commission seems to have limited itself to establishing that
the joint venture partners had the ability to exercise decisive
influence over the joint venture and to assuming that they were
aware of the joint venture's infringement, which they could have
prevented on account of theirjoint control. However, there is no
basis in the case law for attribution of liability on the basis of
assumed awareness. In any event, in view of the GC's judgment in
Spanish Raw Tobacco, any evidence of actual awareness alone
cannot release the Commission from its obligation to establish,
on the basis of a coherent and consistent body of evidence, that
the parent company in fact exercised decisive influence on the
joint venture so that they form an SEU, which is the ultimate and
only basis for attribution of liability.
III. IMPOSITION OF FINES/JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The previous Part argued that in its recent cases, when
attributing liability in joint venture situations, the Commission
departed from the case law established by the EU courts. When it
comes to imposing fines on those entities held liable for the
infringement and when applying the instrument of joint and
several liability, the Commission also seems to have departed
from case law.
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Both in Gas Insulated Switchgear and Chloroprene Rubber, the
Commission imposed a fine for which the shareholders and the
joint venture were held jointly and severally liable.50 However, the
Court in Metsd Serla indicated that the basis for holding entities
jointly and severally liable for the same fine is that they belong to
the same SEU.51 Each of the parent companies was held jointly
and severally liable with the joint venture for only a certain
amount of the total fine (corresponding with its share of supplies
through the joint venture), and the joint venture was held liable
for the total amount.52 The parent companies were not held
jointly and severally liable with each other, as they did not form
an SEU with each other but only with the joint venture, and then
only for a part corresponding to their share of supplies, i.e., their
economic interest in thejoint venture.
In HFB Holdings, the GC once more explained the reason
that, in Metsd Serla, the parent companies of the joint venture
were not held jointly and severally liable with each other:
In that regard, the applicants are incorrect to claim that the
solution adopted in Metsd-Serla and Others v Commission,
where each applicant was held jointly and severally
responsible, up to a certain amount, for the fine imposed on
the association of undertakings, should be applied to them.
That solution may be explained by the fact that in that
situation the association Finnboard formed an economic
entity with each of its member companies, taken individually.
In the present case, on the other hand, there was only one
single economic entity to which [the applicants] belonged.53
Also in Avebe, the joint venture partners Akzo and Avebe
were not held jointly and severally with each other; instead the
Commission imposed fines on each joint venture partner
separately.54
As explained in the previous Part, the Commission can
attribute liability to joint venture partners if it establishes that the
50. Gas Insulated Switchgear, slip op. 1 552; Chloraprene Rubber, 2008 O.J. C 251/11, 1
27.
51. Metsd Serla Sales Oy v. Commission, Case C-294/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. 1-10,079,
11 58-59.
52. See Commission Decision No. IV/C/33.833 (Cartonboard), O.J. L 243/1, 1174.
53. HFB Holding v. Commission, Case T-9/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-1487, 1531.
54. Commission Decision No. COMP/E-1/36.756 (Sodium Gluconate), slip op. at 70
(Oct. 2, 2001).
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joint venture could not act independently on the market but was
merely a vehicle through which the joint venture partners
coordinated their businesses and market conduct. In such cases,
the respective businesses that were coordinated through the joint
venture were therefore part of, and constituted an SEU with, the
respective undertakings of the joint venture partners. Clearly, the
joint venture partners do not constitute an SEU with each other.
As such, in GIS, after establishing that the joint venture was
merely a vehicle through which the joint venture partners
coordinated their business and market conduct, the Commission
should have established that the joint venture constituted an SEU
partly with Hitachi and partly with Fuji. In any event, there is no
basis for finding that Hitachi and Fuji constitute an SEU with
each other. Accordingly they should not have been held jointly
and severally liable with each other. Instead, the joint venture
should have been held liable for the total amount, and each joint
venture partner should have been held jointly and severally liable
with the joint venture for the proportion of the fine that
corresponded with its economic interest in thejoint venture.
Apart from being in line with the case law established in
Metsd Serla, this solution would also avoid practical difficulties
that would otherwise arise when calculating the fine. Some of the
factors that determine the amount of the fine, for example the
deterrence factor55 or the statutory fine maximum, relate to the
size of the group (turnover) of the undertaking concerned.
When the size of the groups to which the joint venture partners
belong differs significantly, it may be impossible to calculate one
single fine for which the joint venture and both joint venture
partners can be held jointly and severally liable (consider Avebe,
where a deterrence multiplier was applied to Akzo's fine but not
to Avebe's fine5 6).
In conclusion, entities can only be held jointly and severally
liable for a fine if they form one SEU with each other. A joint
venture may form an SEU with each of its parent companies, or
any of them, so that such parent company or companies can be
held jointly and severally liable with the joint venture. However,
even if a joint venture forms an SEU with its parent companies,
55. See Commission Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant
to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No. 1/2003, OJ. C 210/2, 1 30.
56. Sodium Gluconate, slip op. 1 388.
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those parent companies do not form an SEU with each other.
The Commission should therefore impose the total amount of
fine on the joint venture and hold each of the joint venture
partners jointly and severally liable with the joint venture for a
proportion of the fine that corresponds with its economic
interest in the joint venture.
CONCLUSION
Until 2007, the Commission generally did not attribute
liability to shareholders for infringements committed by their
joint venture because joint ventures generally do not form an
SEU with any of their shareholders. Since 2007, however, the
Commission has issued several decisions in which it did attribute
liability to shareholders for infringements by joint ventures. It has
done so without distinguishing between joint ventures that were
full function and joint venture that were not. The test applied by
the Commission, simply phrased, is about establishing that
shareholders were able to exercise decisive influence over the
joint venture's market conduct and that they refused to intervene
in order to prevent or stop their joint venture's infringements of
which they were assumed to be aware.
In its 2009 Akzo Nobel judgment, the CJ explicitly confirmed
that it is the fact that an infringing entity and its parent company
constitute an SEU that enables the Commission to attribute
liability to the parent company. In light of this judgment, it is
clear that shareholders cannot be held liable for infringements
committed by an FFJV, which, under EU competition law, is an
independent undertaking and does not form a single economic
unit with any of its shareholders. The Commission's statement
that the fact that an FFJV is an independent undertaking under
the ECMR does not prevent the Commission from finding that it
is not an independent undertaking under Article 101 TFEU
would create different concepts of the notion "undertaking,"
which would go against one of the fundamental principles of EU
competition law established by the courts, i.e., that there is one
concept of "undertaking."
Forjoint ventures that are not full function, such as those in
Metsd Serla and Avebe, the Commission is required to establish
that the joint venture partners to which it seeks to attribute
liability in fact exercised decisive influence over the joint venture
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by directly determining the joint venture's market conduct. In
such a case, the joint venture is not an independent undertaking
but forms an SEU with each of the partners.
In its recent decisions in which liability was attributed to
shareholders of non-FFJVs, the Commission merely established
that the joint venture partners had the ability to exercise decisive
influence over the joint venture and-while assuming that the
joint venture partners were aware of the joint venture's
infringement-that they could have prevented the infringement
on account of their joint control. However, the courts have
established that the Commission should demonstrate that
decisive influence was in fact exercised (not merely that they had
the ability to do so). Furthermore, although the GC has taken
into account proof of actual awareness-not assumed awareness-
as additional evidence of the exercise of decisive influence, it did
not decide that awareness alone would be sufficient to establish
that decisive influence was in fact exercised.
The decisions in which the Commission attributed liability
to shareholders of joint ventures have been appealed and are
currently pending before the GC. The authors' opinion is that
the Commission has overstepped in applying the doctrine of
attribution of liability to shareholders of FFJVs, and that when
applying that doctrine to non-FFJVs, it has strayed from the case
law established by the courts in Metsd Serla and Avebe.
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